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PSYCH
Groupthink and the profile of a Sociopath
Lieutenant Calley, by Monique Laurent PhD
- Lieutenant Calley
"It must be remembered that even the most severely and obviously disabled psychopath presents a technical appearance of sanity, often with high intellectual capacities and not infrequently succeeds in business or professional activities for short periods, some for considerable periods .Although they occasionally appear on casual inspection as successful members of the community, as able lawyers, executive or physicians, they do not, it seems, succeed in the sense of finding satisfaction of fulfillment in their own accomplishments. Nor do they, when the full story is known, appear to find this in an ordinary activity."
--H.Cleckley, "The Mask of Sanity"
During the early morning of March 16th 1968, Task force Baker moved through the jungle and into a handful of hamlets known as My Lai in the Quamg Ngai province of South Vietnam. It was intended to be a typical "search and destroy" mission. That means search for the Vietcong solders which they referred to as "Gooks and Indians" and destroy them by means of machine gun, flame thrower, hand grenade , machete , strangulation, bayonet, napalm, agent orange, or any other kind of method that would snuff the life force out of these Vietnamese solders. The group feeling at the time was that many of the Viennese villagers had been adding and abetting the communists gorillas to such an extent that it was difficult for many of them to make the distinction between who was a solider and who was not.
Task force barker had been hastily trained the previous month and had not achieved much success and in fact had sustained several causalities from mines and booby traps.
When Task force Barker, who were directly involved with the 1st Battalion, 20th infantry of the 11th light infantry brigade AKA Company Charlie ,move into My Lai, all they found was unarmed woman, children ,, Buddhist monks ,older men in their 70s and 80s. What happened next was one of the most shameful and inconceivable acts of barbarism, murder, rape and pillaging in modern American military history.
There has been much speculation and several theories as to what could have triggered this bloodbath of between 500 and 600 unarmed Vietnamese civilians and what was just as bad or even worse, the cover-up by a couple of hundred US solders.
M S Peck wrote in People of the Lie that the My Lai massacre cover-up was a gigantic group lie. Peck was the military psychiatrist who was asked to investigate this case by the US military, to understand and to discover ways for this to never happen again. He suggests it was a case of groupthink, or" group evil" by a specialized group of people.
He writes
"Specialization contributes to the immaturity of groups and their potential for evil through several different mechanisms.. for a moment I will restrict myself to the consideration of only one such mechanism: the fragmentation of conscience. If at the time of M y Lai, wondering through the halls of the Pentagon, I stopped to talk to with men responsible for directing the manufacture of napalm and its transportation to Vietnam in the form of bombs, and if I questioned these men about the morality of the war and hence its morality of what they were engaged in, this is the kind of reply I inevitably received".
"Oh we appreciate your concerns, yes, we do, but I'm afraid you've come to the wrong people. We're not the department you want. This is the ordinance branch. We just supply the weapons we don't determine how and where they they are used. That's policy. What you want to do is talk to the policy people down the hall"
. And if I follow this suggestion and expressed the same concerns in the policy branch, this is the response.
"Oh we understand that there are broad issues involved, but im afraid they are beyond our purview. We simply determine how the war will be conducted - not weather it will be conducted. You see the military only does what its told to do. These broad issues are directed at the white house level, not here. That's where you need to take your concerns". So it went
Whenever the rules of individuals within a group become specialized, it becomes both possible and easy for the individual to pass the moral buck to some other part of the group. in this way not only does the individual forsakes his conscience but the conscience of the group as a whole can become fragmented and diluted as to be nonexistent. M Scott Peck. McCoy’s men had just killed 92 Iraqis and taken 44 prisoners, with no injuries to the American troops. Once the peace came and protests began with Iraqis shouting, “Americans Go Home,” American soldiers fired into crowds of unarmed civilians, killing many.
Groupthink is a concept that was identified by Irving Janis that refers to faulty decision-making in a group. Groups experiencing groupthink do not consider all alternatives and they desire unanimity at the expense of quality decisions. Groupthink occurs when groups are highly cohesive and when they are under considerable pressure to make a quality decision. By not being critical of each others ideas. Not seeking expert advice. Being highly selective in gathering information not having contingency plans. some symptoms of group think are having illusions of invulnerability. Rationalizing poor decisions. Believing in group morality. Sharing stereotypes which guide the decisions. Exercising direct pressures on others. Not expressing your true feelings. Maintaining an illusions of unanimity. Using mind guards to protect the group from negative information.
Below are just a few of the symptoms and indications of a sociopath and excepts form the Lieutenant Calley court marshal.
Glibness/Superficial Charm
Language can be used without effort by them to confuse and convince their audience. Captivating storytellers that exude self-confidence, they can spin a web that intrigues others. Since they are persuasive, they have the capacity to destroy their critics verbally or emotionally.
Manipulative and Conning
They never recognize the rights of others and see their self-serving behaviors permissible. They appear to be charming, yet are covertly hostile and domineering, seeing their victim as merely an instrument to be used. They dominate and humiliate their victims.Grandiose Sense of Self
Feels entitled to certain things as "their right." Craves adulation and attendance. Must be the center of attention with their own fantasies as the "spokesman for God," "enlightened," "leader of humankind," etc. Creates an us-versus-them mentalityPathological Lying
Has no problem lying coolly and easily and it is almost impossible for them to be truthful on a consistent basis. Can create, and get caught up in, a complex belief about their own powers and abilities. Extremely convincing and able to pass lie detector tests.Lack of Remorse, Shame or Guilt
A deep seated rage, which is split off and repressed, is at their core. Does not see others around them as people, but only as targets and opportunities. Instead of friends, they have victims and accomplices who end up as victims. The end always justifies the means and they let nothing stand in their way.Shallow Emotions
When they show what seems to be warmth, joy, love and compassion, it is more feigned than experienced and serves an ulterior motive. Outraged by insignificant matters, yet remaining unmoved and cold by what would upset a normal person. Since they are not genuine, neither are their promises.Incapacity for Love
While they talk about "God's love" they are unable to give or receive it. Since they do not believe in the genuineness of their followers' love, they are very harsh in testing it from their devotees and expect them to feel guilt for their failings. Expects unconditional surrender.
Need for Stimulation
Living on the edge, yet testing the beliefs of their followers with bizarre rules, punishments and behaviors. Verbal outbursts and physical punishments are normal.Callousness/Lack of Empathy
Unable to empathize with the pain of their victims, having only contempt for others' feelings of distress and readily taking advantage of them. Their skills are used to exploit, abuse and exert power. Since the follower cannot believe their leader would callously hurt them, they rationalize the behavior as necessary for their (or the group's) own "good" and deny the abuse. When devotees become aware of the exploitation it feels like a "spiritual rape" to them.
Poor Behavioral Controls/Impulsive Nature
Rage and abuse, alternating with small expressions of love and approval produce an addictive cycle for abuser and abused, as well as creating hopelessness in the victim. Believe they are all-powerful, all-knowing, entitled to every wish, no sense of personal boundaries, no concern for their impact on others. The followers only see them as near perfect.
Early Behavior Problems/Juvenile Delinquency
Usually has a history of behavioral and academic difficulties, yet "gets by" by conning others. Problems in making and keeping friends; aberrant behaviors such as cruelty to people or animals, stealing, etc.
Irresponsibility/Unreliability
Not concerned about wrecking others' lives and dreams. Oblivious or indifferent to the devastation they cause. Does not accept blame themselves, but blame their followers or others outside their group. Blame reinforces passivity and obedience and produces guilt, shame, terror and conformity in the followers.
Promiscuous Sexual Behavior/Infidelity
Totalist leaders frequently practice promiscuity, child sexual abuse, rape and sexual acting out of all sorts. This is usually kept hidden from all but the inner circle. Stringent sexual control of their followers, such as forced breakups and divorces, removal of children from parents, rules for dating, etc.
Lack of Realistic Life Plan/Parasitic Lifestyle
Tends to move around a lot or makes all encompassing promises for the future. Many groups claim as their goal world-domination or other utopian promises. Great contrast between the leader's opulent lifestyle and the followers' impoverishment. Support by gifts and donations from the followers who are pressured to give through fear and guilt. Highly sensitive to their own pain and health.
Criminal or Entrepreneurial Versatility
Changes their image and that of the group as needed to avoid prosecution and to increase income and to recruit a range of members. Is able to adapt or relocate as needed to preserve the group. Can resurface later with a new name, a new front group and a new twist on the scam.
Contemptuous of those who seek to understand them
Does not perceive that anything is wrong with them
Authoritarian
Secretive
Paranoid
Only rarely in difficulty with the law, but seeks out situations where their tyrannical behavior will be tolerated, condoned, or admired
Conventional appearance
Goal of enslavement of their victim(s)
Exercises despotic control over every aspect of the victim's life
Has an emotional need to justify their crimes and therefore needs their victim's affirmation (respect, gratitude and love)
Ultimate goal is the creation of a willing victim
Incapable of real human attachment to another
Unable to feel remorse or guilt
Extreme narcissism and grandiose
May state readily that their goal is to rule the world The above traits are based on the psychopathy checklists of H. Cleckley and R. Hare. In the 1830's this disorder was called "moral insanity." By 1900 it was changed to "psychopathic personality." More recently it has been termed "antisocial personality disorder."
The Massacre at My Lai Vietnam 1968
This is just a part. Up to 500 men women elderly children were murdered.
Below are excepts from the court marshal of Lieutenant Calley.
Dennis Conti, Witness for the Prosecution
Direct examination by Aubrey Daniels:
A: As I came up, he [Calley] said round up the people.
Q: What did you do?
A: So I did, rounded up the people. There were five or six, mostly women and children. They were unarmed and huddled together.
Q: "What did you do with them?
A: I brought them back to Calley on the trail. There were others there. Thirty or forty. All women and children I remember one old man. They were in their sixties to infants.
Q: What were they doing?
A: Just standing there.
Q: Who was with them?
A: The only GI I remember was Meadlo.
Q: What happened then?
A: Calley told me and Meadlo to take the people off and push them in a rice paddy. We took them out there, pushed them off the trail and made them squat down and bunch up so they couldn't get up and run. We stayed there and guarded the. At this time, I see a young child running from a hootch toward us. He seen us and he took off. I dropped my gear and checked out a hootch with a woman and a child in it. There was an old woman in a under. I took her out and put her on the ground. Then I saw a man running away. I took the other woman and child to the group. The old woman wouldn't go, so I left her there.
Q: What was Meadlo doing at this time?
A: He was guarding the people?
Q: Where was he?
A: He was standing on the village side of the people.
Q: Then what happened?
A: Lieutenant Calley came out and said take care of these people.
So we said, okay, so we stood there and watched them. He went away, then he came back and said, "I thought I told you to take care of these people.
We said, "We are.
He said, "I mean, kill them.
I was a little stunned and I didn't know what to do.
He said, "Come around this side. We'll get on line and we'll fire into them.
I said, "No, I've got a grenade launcher. I'll watch the tree line. I stood behind them and they stood side by side. So they -- Calley and Meadlo -- got on line and fired directly into the people. There were bursts and single shots for two minutes. It was automatic. The people screamed and yelled and fell. I guess they tried to get up, too. They couldn't. That was it. They people were pretty well messed up. Lots of heads was shot off, pieces of heads and pieces of flesh flew off the sides and arms. They were all messed up. Meadlo fired a little bit and broke down. He was crying.
He said he couldn't do any more. He couldn't kill anymore people. He couldn't fire into the people any more. He gave me his weapon into my hands.
I said I wouldn't. "If they're going to be killed, I'm not going to do it. Let Lieutenant Calley do it, I told him. So I gave Meadlo back his weapon. At that time there was only a few kids still alive Lieutenant Calley killed them one-by-one. The I saw a group of five women and six kids -- eleven in all -- going to a tree line.
"Get ‘em! Get ‘em! Kill ‘em! Calley told me. I waited until they got to the line and fired off four or five grenades. I don't know what happened....
Cross examination by Richard Kay:
Q: Did you see any dead bodies at My Lai? --- How many?
A: Quite a few
Q: Were they sleeping or did they appear to be dead?
A: Well, they had holes in ‘em so I assumed they were dead...
Q: Were you under medical treatment that day?
A: No.
Q: Isn't it a fact that you were taking penicillin for venereal disease?
A: No. . . . Oh, yeah you're right. I was getting shots.
Q: Isn't it a fact that the medic was carrying penicillin to give you that day on the mission?
A: Yeah, I guess you're right.
Q: And weren't you under the influence of marijuana on March 16, 1968?
A: No.
Q: Didn't you smoke it the night before?
A: No.
Q: Didn't you smoke it before getting into the helicopters that morning?
A: No.
Q: Weren't you a constant marijuana smoker?
A: No.
Q: Did you ever open your pants in front of a woman in the village of My Lai?
A: No.
Q: Isn't it a fact that you were going through My Lai that day looking for women?
A: No.
Q: Didn't you carry a woman half-nude on your shoulders and throw her down and say that say was too dirty to rape? You did do that, didn't you?
A: Oh yeah, but it wasn't at My Lai....
Q: Didn't you cuss Lieutenant Calley out because he stopped you from performing a perverse, unnatural sex act at My Lai?
A: No
Q: Do you remember you went into a hootch and started to rape a woman and Lieutenant Calley told you to get out? Do you deny that occurred?
A: Yes.
Q: Didn't you go around and tell members of your platoon about the number of times you'd raped Vietnamese women?
A: No.
Q: You didn't like Lieutenant Calley, did you, Mr. Conti?
A: I didn't dislike him; I didn't like him. He was just there.
Q: As a matter of fact, you hated him didn't you?
A: No.
Q: Do you remember one night, you were on guard duty and had a M-79 and you shot all your ammunition so when it came time to go on patrol, you didn't have any ammunition left? You remember that night?
A: That's right I didn't have any ammunition left.
Q: Weren't you mad at Lieutenant Calley for reporting you?
A: I don't think so.
Q: You deny that?
A: Yes, I do.
Q: Mr. Conti, isn't it a fact that you'd like to see Lieutenant Calley hanged?
A: No.
Lt. William Calley, Witness for the Defense
Direct examination by George Latimer:
Q: Now, I will ask you if during these periods of instruction and training, you were instructed by anybody in connection with the Geneva Conference?
A: Yes, sir, I was.
Q: And what was it -- do you have a recollection, what was the extent and nature of that tutoring?
A: I know there were classes. I can't remember any of the classes. Nothing stands out in my mind what was covered in the classes, sir.
Q: Did you learn anything in those classes of what actually the Geneva Convention covered as far as rules and regulations of warfare are concerned?
A: No, sir. Laws and rules of warfare, sir.
Q: Did you receive any training in any of those places which had to do with obedience to orders?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What were the nature of the -- what were you informed was the principles involved in that field?
A: That all orders were to be assumed legal, that the soldier's job was to carry out any order given him to the best of his ability.
Q: Did you tell your doctor or inform him anything about what might occur if you disobeyed an order by a senior officer?
A: You could be court-martialed for refusing an order and refusing an order in the face of the enemy, you could be sent to death, sir.
Q: Well, let me ask you this: what I am talking and asking is whether or not you were given any instructions on the necessity for -- or whether you were required in any way, shape or form to make a determination of the legality or illegality of an order?
A: No, sir. I was never told that I had the choice, sir.
Q: If you had a doubt about the order, what were you supposed to do?
A: If I had -- questioned an order, I was supposed to carry the order out and then come back and make my complaint. later
Q: Now, during the course of your movement through the village, had you seen any Vietnamese dead, or dead bodies?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And how would you classify it as to whether it was a few, many, how would you -- what descriptive phrase would you use for your own impression?
A: Many.
Q: Now, did you see some live Vietnamese while you were going through the village?
A: I saw two, sir.
Q: All right. Now, tell us, was there an incident concerning those two?
A: Yes, sir. I shot and killed both of them.
Q: Under what circumstances?
A: There was a large concrete house and I kind of stepped up on the porch and looked in the window. There was about six to eight individuals laying on the floor, apparently dead. And one man was going for the window. I shot him. There was another man standing in a fireplace. He looked like he had just come out of the fireplace, or out of the chimney. And I shot him, sir. He was in a bright green uniform....
Q: All right. Now that you gave that incident, did you see any other live individuals who were in the village itself as you made through the sweep?
A: Well, when I got to the eastern edge of the village, I saw a group of Vietnamese just standing right outside the eastern edge of the village, sir, the southeastern edge.
Q: All right. Was there anybody there with that group of individuals that you saw at that time?
A: I recollect that there were GI's there with them....
A: I heard a considerable volume of firing to my north, and I moved along the edge of the ditch and around a hootch and I broke into the clearing, and my men had a number of Vietnamese in the ditch and were firing upon them.
Q: When you say your men, can you identify any of the men?
A: I spoke to Dursi and I spoke to Meadlo, sir.
Q: Was there anybody else there that you can identify by name
A: No, sir. There was a few other troops, but it was insignificant to me at the time and I didn't--
Q: What was your best impression of how many were there at the ditch?
A: Four to five, sir.
Q: Two of whom you can specifically identify, Meadlo and Dursi?
A: Yes, sir. I spoke to those two.
Q: What did you do after you saw them shooting in the ditch? A: Well, I fired into the ditch also sir. . .
Q: Now, did you have a chance to look and observe what was in the ditch?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what did you see?
A: Dead people, sir.
Q: Let me ask you, at any time that you were alone and near the ditch, did you push or help push people into the ditch?
A: Yes and no, sir.
Q: Give us the yes part first.
A: Well, when I came out of this hedgerow, I came right up -- came right up about the last man to go into the ditch. I didn't physically touch him, but if he would have stopped, I guess I would have.
Q: Well, did he -- was somebody there with him to order him in or push him in?
A: They had been ordered in -- to go to the ditch, sir.
Q: Do you know who gave them that information?
A: Well, indirectly, I did, sir.
Q: And indirectly, what do you mean by that, was it through somebody?
A: I had told Meadlo to get them on the other side of the ditch, sir....
Q: All right. Then what did you do?
A: I butt-stroked him in the mouth, sir.
Q: With what effect?
A: It knocked him down.
Q: Did you shoot him?
A: No, sir, I did not....
Q: Let me ask you another -- your impressions of another incident. There has been some testimony in the record to the effect that there was a child running from the ditch, that you threw him back into the ditch and you shot him. Did you participate in any such event?
A: No, sir, I did not.
Q: Did you see a boy or a child running from the ditch?
A: Wait, let me backtrack. Now this child that I supposedly said I shot, now, was running away from the ditch, but it is not in the same location. It is east of the ditch, but he was running away from the ditch. Now, I don't--
Q: To the extent that you shot and it turned out ultimately to be a child, is that the only impression you have of any incident which involved a child?
A: Yes, sir, I do.
Q: There has been some information disclosed that you heard before the court that you stood there at the ditch for a considerable period of time; that you waited and had your troops organized, groups of Vietnamese thrown in the ditch and knocked them down in the ditch or pushed them in the ditch and that you fired there for approximately and hour and a half as those groups were marched up. Did you participate in any such shooting or any such event?
A: No, sir, I did not.
Q: Did you at any time direct anybody to push people in the ditch?
A: Like I said, I gave the order to take those people through the ditch and had also told Meadlo if he couldn't move them, to waste them, and I directly -- other than that, there was only that one incident. I never stood up there for any period of time. The main mission was to get my men on the other side of the ditch and get in that defensive position, and that is what I did, sir.
Q: Now, why did you give Meadlo a message or the order that if he couldn't get rid of the to waste them?
A: Because that was my order, sir. That as the order of the day, sir.
Q: Who gave you that order?
A: My commanding officer, sir.
Q: He was?
A: Captain Medina, sir.
Q: And stated in that posture, in substantially those words, how many times did you receive such an order from Captain Medina?
A: The night before in the company briefing, platoon leaders' briefing, the following morning before we lifted off and twice there in the village. . .
Q: Can you identify the east -- what has been testified to as the east-west, north-south trails on the map?
A: You mean from being there or being in this courtroom?
Q: Well, from being there?
A: No, sir. I never had any idea where an east-west trail was, sir.
Q: Did you ever pass the area, in your maneuvering that day, which would bring you into a situation where you would see what was on the north-south trail south of the perimeter of the village itself? Did you go south far enough, or did you see along the north-south trail any group of bodies?
A: No, sir, I didn't no. . I was never down in that area, sir. . .I never went down there; I never saw anything down there.
Q: Did you ever, in your walking through this area, see any large group of Vietnamese of various sexes and ages dead in large piles or large groups?
A: Where I shot two men, there was, I would say, a large group of people already dad in that building. It would have been five to six dead people there. Other than the ditch, no, sir. That was all, that was the only group of people I saw there, sir. Large I mean.
Q: All right. Did you see some isolated groups of what you would call a small, or numerically might be around five or six, along that area?
A: Five or six sounds pretty large to me. I would say there would be groups of two and three here and there, sir, up to five and six in groups. But the only one that stands out in my mind is the one inside the building. And just people, dead people spread all over the village. . .
Q: Tell the court, in your judgment, how many rounds of ammunition you expended?
A: I am not absolutely sure. I, during lunchtime, I know -- that is the only time I changed magazines. I don't thing I used -- I still had rounds left in the original magazine, but moving out, I went on and made sure I had a full magazine. Just sort of precautionary
Q: In your personal situation, what did you use as a full load for a magazine?
A: Eighteen, sir....
Q: I am going to ask you this: During this operation, May Lai Four, did you intend specifically to kill Vietnamese -- man, woman, or child?
A: No, sir, I did not.
Q: Did you ever form any intent, specifically or generally, in connection with that My Lai operation to waste any Vietnamese -- man, woman, or child?
A : No sir, I did not.
Q: Now, did you on that occasion intend to waste something?
A: To waste or destroy the enemy, sir.
Q: All right. Now, what was your intention in connection with the carrying out of that operation as far as any premeditation or intent was concerned?
A: To go into the area and destroy the enemy that were designated there, and this is it. I went into the area to destroy the enemy, sir.
Q: Did you form any impression as to whether or not there were children, women, or men, or what did you see in front of you as you were going on?
A: I never sat down to analyze it, men, women, and children. They were enemy and just people.
Q: Did you consciously discriminate at you were operating through there insofar as sex or age is concerned?
A: The only time I denoted sex was when I stopped Conti from molesting a girl. That was the only time sex ever entered the -- my whole scope of thinking.
Q: In this instance, we you saw a group being supervised or guarded by Meadlo, how did you visualize that group? Did you go in the specifics in any way?
A: No, sir. It was a group of people that were the enemy, sir.
Q: And were you motivated by other things besides the fact that those were the enemy? Did you have some other reason for treating them that way altogether? I am talking now about your briefings. Did you get any information out of that?
A: Well, I was ordered to go in there and destroy the enemy. That was my job on that day. That was the mission I was given. I did not sit down and think in terms of men, women, and children. They were all classified the same, and that was the classification that we dealt with, just as enemy soldiers.
Q: Who gave you that classification the last time you got it?
A: Captain Medina, sir. . .
Q: Now, I will ask you this, Lieutenant Calley: Whatever you did at My Lai on that occasion, I will ask you whether in your opinion you were acting rightly and according to your understanding of your directions and orders?
A: I felt then and I still do that I acted as I was directed, and I carried out the orders that I was given, and I do not feel wrong in doing so, sir....
Q: In connection with this operation, were you asked by Captain Medina to give a body count?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were all platoon commanders asked the same question, to your knowledge?
A: I know the second platoon was there with me, and he also gave a body count, sir.
Q: And did you hear the total results turned in to Captain Medina?
A: No, sir
Q: You don't know what the other two platoons turned in?
A: Yes, sir, I think I know how the platoon thing ran, sir.
Q: All right, tell us how it ran?
A: My platoon, I believe, took fifty; second platoon took fifty; third platoon took fifty; and we gave fifty to the artillery and fifty to the gunships and just about roughly about that much. I don't have the exact figures but it was around in that area, sir.
Q: Well, it was now -- when you say you took this and we took that, was that in the presence of Captain Medina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And did you sit down in his presence and figure out this body count and give it to him?
A: You just make an estimate off the top of your head. There is no way to really figure out exact body count. At that time, everything went into a body count -- VC, buffalo, pigs, cows. Something we did, you put it on your body count, sir.
Q: Is that the procedure adopted in your task force?
A: It was about -- I would say it was running that way, yes, sir. I wouldn't say it was an adopted procedure, but that is about how it was being run and estimate
Q: And in connection with that, at this luncheon, was there some discussion about the method to be employed or was that the method that was just employed by you and the other commanders?
A: I was -- never heard of a method that was trained in employing to come up with a body count. As long as it was high, that was all they wanted.
Q: There weren't any specifics, but this was desirable?
A: Right. I had been on it enough times where they told me, just come back with a body count.
Q: Were you ever criticized for a body count?
A: I was criticized for getting too many shot and not coming back with the enemy.
Q: Did your commanders seek to get a high estimate from you?
A: I generally knew if I lost a troop, I'd better come back with a body count of ten, say I shot at least ten of the enemy, which was pretty hard when you are only fighting one sniper.
Cross examination by Daniel:
Q: Did you receive any fire getting off the helicopter?
A: I have no way to know, sir. I was not hit, no, sir.
Q: Were you consciously aware of receiving any fire?
A: No, sir, I wasn't . . .
Q: Did you receive any fire during this period you were waiting?
A: No, sir....
Q: Did you see any Vietnamese?
A: Yes, sir
Q: Where was the first time you saw Vietnamese?
A: In the tapioca patch.
Q: Could you describe the Vietnamese you saw in the tapioca patch?
A: No sir.
Q: What was he doing?
A: He was dead, sir.
Q: Was it a man or a woman?
A: I don't know, sir.
Q: When is the next time you saw a Vietnamese?
A: About three feet beyond him, sir.
Q: What was he doing?
A: He was also dead, sir.
Q: When was the next time you saw one?
A: I would say they were all throughout the village. I don't -- I can't pick out every Vietnamese that I saw dead there. Just all the way through the village, there were dead Vietnamese.
Q: When is the first time you saw a live one?
A: On the eastern edge -- well, the two that I shot while going through there, sir.
Q: Those were the only live Vietnamese you saw going through?
A: That I can remember, yes, sir.
Q: Did you give out any instructions to your men to gather up the people that were there?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who did you give those instructions to?
A: Sergeant Mitchell, sir.
Q: To have them gathered up?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: For what purpose?
A: Clearing the mine field, sir. I told him to hang onto some of the Vietnamese inc case we encountered a mine field, sir....
Q: What were you firing at?
A: At the enemy, sir.
Q: At people?
A: At the enemy, sir.
Q: They weren't even human beings?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were they men?
A: I don't know sir. I would imagine they were, sir.
Q: Didn't you see?
A: Pardon, sir?
Q: Did you see them?
A: I wasn't discriminating.
Q: Did you see women?
A: I don't know, sir.
Q: What do you mean you weren't discriminating?
A: I didn't discriminate between individuals in the village, sir. They were all the enemy, they were all to be destroyed, sir....
Q: How did you know they were slowing you down?
A: Well, I generally know how South Vietnamese people move, and if you are going to move South Vietnamese people, you are not going to move them very fast, sir.
Q: Why did you tell Captain Medina they were slowing you down?
A: Because I knew they were slowing me down. It was another element that I had to move. . .
Q: Why were they being moved at all?
A: To clear a mine filed, sir, if necessary.
Q: What did Captain Medina say when you had the group of people, when you told him--
A: He told me basically to get rid of the people, to get moving
Q: He told you that basically?
A: To the best of my knowledge. I can't remember his exact words.
Q: You described the people to him?
A: No, sir. I didn't
Q: How did you describe them to him?
A: Vietnamese. VC
Q: Which?
A: Either one. I don't know, sir.
Q: You don't know how you described them?
A: In that area, I could have used either term.
Q: Do you know if there were women in that group?
A: No, sir.
Q: Do you know if there were children in that group?
A: No, sir.
Q: Do you know if there were men in that group?
A: No, sir.
Q: What did he say?
A: He told me to give -- to get rid of the people and get moving.
Q: What did you do?
A: I rogered . . .
Q: How did you interpret that?
A: As getting rid of them if I couldn't move them fast enough.
Q: Did you check with your men to see if they could move them fast enough?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was it fast enough?
A: So we could get into position in a relatively short period of time, sir.
Q: What did you do to effect this order?
A: At that time, I ran into Meadlo there and I asked him if he knew what he was supposed to be doing with those people.
Q: When you saw him where?
A: With a group of people, sir. I was on my way to a Sergeant Mitchell, sir. . . I saw Conti trying to molest a female, sexually molest a female.
Q: What was that?
A: Same time, sir, that I talked to Meadlo.
Q: Were they together?
A: No, sir.
Q: How did you do that? Describe the situation.
A: I went up to him and told him to stop what he was doing and get over where he was supposed to be at, sir.
Q: Were you talking to Meadlo at the same time?
A: No, sir.
Q: How far was Conti from Meadlo?
A: I don't know, sir.
Q: You saw them both at the same time?
A: I talked to Meadlo as I continued to move by him. I saw Conti molesting a female.
Q: Where?
A: On the other side of the group, sir.
Q: How long did you talk to Meadlo?
A: Only for a matter of seconds, sir.
Q: What did you say to him?
A: I asked him if he knew what to do with those people.
Q: What did he say?
A: He said he did, sir. I told him to get moving, sir.
Q: What did you mean when you said to him, "Get moving "?
A: Get the people moving, get them to the other side of the ditch.
Q: You didn't mean for him to kill them?
A: Not if he could move them, no, sir. I am still worried about the mine field, sir.
Q: Did he move them?
A: No sir.
Q: How far did you get before you ran into Conti?
A: Two steps.
Q: Did he have one of the people out of his group?
A: Right, sir.
Q: What did you say to Conti?
A: Told him to stop doing what he was doing and get to where he was supposed to be.
Q: What did he say?
A: He said, roger, and moved out.
Q: That is all he said?
A: Well, I don't know what he said. To the best of my knowledge, he could have said nothing.
Q: You weren't--
A: No, sir. Unless he said something to the negative, which he didn't as far as I was concerned
Q: Did he pull up his pants?
A: Yes, sir. I would imagine he would. He would look kind of funny if he hadn't
Q: Did you see him pull up his pants?
A: I didn't notice, no, sir. I wasn't paying attention to whether he had his pants up or down. I f he wanted to go around like that, that was his business.
Q: You weren't concerned with whether he was stopped or not?
A: Well, I stopped him, sir.
Q: D id he pull up his pants?
A: I don't know, sir. I didn't stand there to see if he pulled up his pants.
Q: How do you know if he stopped?
A: Because he released the girl's hair.
Q: And then what did you do?
A: She fell back.
Q: And you just left and walked away?
A: He started on his way.
Q: When is the last time you saw him?
A: That is the last time I recall seeing him that day, sir.
Q: Were you angry when he hadn't moved the group?
A: I don't think a violent anger, no, sir. It was distressing. It was slowing me down. But it wasn't actually Meadlo's fault. I mean, I didn't take it personally out on him.
Q: You didn't feel like he disobeyed your order in not moving the people at all?
A: He had basically disobeyed my order. But I didn't know what his problem was. I didn't take out a resentment on him. As far as I know, he didn't move the people.
Q: He disobeyed your order?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: This didn't upset you in combat, that a subordinate had disobeyed your order?
A: Not that order, no, sir. I felt that the man was trying to do the job the best way he could.
Q: So it depends on the type of order?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you say to him, then, on that occasion?
A: If he couldn't move the people, to waste them, sir.
Q: What did he say?
A: He said, roger....
Q: What did you find when you got there?
A: My men were shooting men in the ditch, sir.
Q: What men?
A: Vietnamese men, sir.
Q: They were all men?
A: I don't know, sir.
Q: Did you look?
A: I looked into the ditch, yes, sir.
Q: What did you do when you got there?
A: I fired into the ditch, told my men to hurry up and get on the other side and get into position.
Q: Who of your men were there?
A: I spoke -- I recognized Meadlo being there and I recognized Dursi being there. There were other men there. I can't relate who they were, sir. . .
Q: Did you say anything to Dursi?
A: Yes, sir. . . told him to get on the other side of the ditch.
Q: Did you say anything to Meadlo?
A: Yes, sir. . . told him to hurry and get on the other side of the ditch.
Q: Did you shake him?
A: Yes, sir. . . Well, I didn't stand there and -- I just grabbed him by the arm and pointed him in the direction.
Q: Was he crying?
A: I don't know, sir. . .
Q: How long did you fire into the ditch?
A: I have no idea, sir.
Q: How many shots did you fire?
A: Six to eight, sir.
Q: One burst or semi-automatic?
A: Semi-automatic, sir. .
Q: Who did you fire at?
A: Into the ditch, sir.
Q: What at in the ditch?
A: At the people in the ditch, sir.
Q: How many people were in the ditch?
A: I don't know, sir.
Q: Over how large an area were they in the ditch?
A: I don't know, sir.
Q: Could you give us an estimate as to how many people were in the ditch?
A: No, sir.
Q: Would you say it was a large group?
A: No, sir. . .
Q: What were these people doing as they were being fired upon?
A: Nothing sir.
Q: Were they being hit?
A: I would imagine so, sir.
Q: Do you know?
A: I don't know if they were being hit when I saw them, no, sir.
Q: Do you know if you hit any of them?
A: No, sir, I don't.
Q: How far away were you from them when you fired?
A: The muzzle would have been five feet, sir.
Q: You didn't see the bullets impact?
A: Not that I recall, no, sir. . . My main thing was to go on, finish off these people as fast as possible and get my people out into position, sir.
Q: Why?
A: because that is what I was instructed to do, sir, and I had been delayed long enough. I was trying to get out there before I got criticized again, sir....
A: After he said No Viet" again, I butt stroked him in the mouth, sir.
Q: How hard did you butt-stroke him?
A: Quite hard, sir.
Q: What damage did it do?
A: It bloodied his face, sir.
Q: Did you hit him square in the mouth?
A: I hit his mouth, yes, sir.
Q: Did he go down on the ground?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And then what did you do?
A: I had seen the helicopter by that time. I saw Sergeant Lagunoy come up toward me and I started moving toward Sergeant Lagunoy. . .
Q: Where was the man when you left him?
A: When I started walking away from him, he was on the ground. By the time I got two more steps he was in the ditch, sir.
Q: How did he get in the ditch?
A: Someone drop-kicked him into it.
Q: Was he still alive?
A: I don't know sir. I would imagine he was, sir.
Q; Did anybody shoot him?
A: I don't know, sir.
Q: You just left the man in the ditch?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you search him for any weapons?A: No sir.
Q: Had you directed that any of those people be searched?A: No, sir.
Q: How close were those people to you in the ditch?
A: Three feet, sir.
Q: Were you scared they might be booby-trapped?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Might have a grenade on them?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why didn't you direct that they be searched?
A: I feel much more secure in that situation not to search them, sir, or get that close to them. If a man made a move, you can defend yourself and get out of the way rather than bend down to try to search him if he pulls a grenade.
Q: Did you ever direct that anybody be searched?
A: No, sir, not that day. No, sir.
Q: Did you tell him the only way you could get them out was with a hand grenade?
A: No, sir, I did not. . . let me retract that statement. I hadn't thought about it until now. I believe I might have, yes, sir. I said about the only means I have to evacuate them out of there would be a hand grenade.
Q: How do you evacuate someone with a hand grenade?
A: I don't have any idea, sir.
Q: Why did you make the statement?
A: I t was a figure of speech, sir.
Q: What did you mean when you said it?
A: I meant -- just I meant only that the only means I could evacuate the people would be a hand grenade. And that isn't exactly evacuating somebody.
Q: What did you mean when you said it?
A: A figure of speech, sir, basically meaning that I didn't have any means to evacuate these people with, sir.
Q: That you would kill them if he didn't evacuate them?
A: No, sir, I didn't mean that, sir.
Q: What would you have done with them if he hadn't evacuated them?
A: I don't know, sir.
Q: Would you have taken them prisoner?
A: I don't know, sir.
Q: The cease-fire order had been given, had it not?
A: Yes, sir, to the best of my knowledge, it had. My troops had stopped firing, yes, sir. . .
Q: How many people were there?
A: I believe . . . I don't remember the exact number, basically about -- I don't really know sir. . . There were two gunship loads. I would say three or four on each gunship. Of course, they were Vietnamese, be much lighter, maybe they could have gotten six on the gunships, I don't know.
Q: Do you recall the sex of these people?
A: No, sir, I don't.
Q: Were there any children?
A: Yes, sir. Well, I am saying that they had to be definitely noncombatants, sir.
Q: You were discriminating at this point between sexes?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why were you discriminating then?
A: Well, I wasn't discriminating against sexes, let me put that up. But I had a means to discriminate, and we were no longer firing on -- I had been given a no-fire...
A: He asked me about how many -- basically what my body count -- how many people we had killed that day. And I told him I had no idea and for him to just go on and come up with an estimate, sir.
Q: Is that what you said to him?
A: Yes, sir. He had been to the area and seen the area, he could relate body count as well as I could, sir.
Q: Did he say what body count he would attribute to your platoon?
A: No, sir.
Q: How do you know he had been over the area?
A: I hadn't really know if he was over my area, sir.
Q: How did you know if he could arrive at a body count of your area?
A: Because he would have a better idea of what sort of body count he would want to put in than I would, sir.
Q: Just any body count? Just any body count, is that what you are saying?
A: Basically, yes, sir.
Q: Captain Medina could just put any body count that he wanted to put?
A: Any body count that was reasonable. I would imagine he would put the highest acceptable body count that he could.
Q: Did you have any other conversation with him?
A: No, sir. We continued on that discussion for quite some time.
Q: Could you relate the remainder of that discussion?
A: After he had given the body count and called it in, we were getting ready to split up and start moving agin, and higher called Captain Medina, called back and asked what percentage of that was civilians, that they had a report there was a high amount of civilians in the village, sir.
Q: What body count did he report?
A: I don't know, to be exact. I really don't.
Q: Did he give an actual body count?
A: Yes and no. I don't remember exactly what it was. I remember that I took fifty, sir.
Q: You did not hear him make a report?
A: Not exactly. I don't know what he finally came up with, though I believe it would be between two hundred fifty and three hundred, sir.
Q: When did you take fifty?
A: When we were discussing body count. It was broken down, fifty, fifty, fifty.
Q: When did this come up in discussion?
A: When we were sitting there discussing body counts, sir. . .
Q: Did you tell Captain Medina that you had shot the people in the ditch?
A: Yes, sir. I did.
Q: Did he ask any facts about that?
A: No, sir.
Q: How did you tell him about it?
A: He asked -- well, after the higher called back and asked -- said it had been reported that a lot of civilians were killed in the area, he wanted to know what the percentage of civilians was.
Q: What did you tell him?
A: I told him he would have to make that decision, sir.
Q: Is that what you told him? Those were your exact words to the captain?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did he ask you to describe the people you had shot?
A: No, sir.
Q: Did you give him any estimate?
A: No, sir.
Q: Did you tell him which of your men had been involved?
A: Involved in what, sir?
Q: Shooting into the ditch.
A: There wasn't any big deal, no sir.
Q: You told Captain Medina that you had rounded these people up, put them in the ditch and shot them?
A: No, sir. I didn't.
Q: What did you tell him?
A: I told him there was people shot over there in the ditch and people shot all through the village.
Q: Did you tell him the circumstances under which they had been shot?
A: No, sir. Why should I? He knew what -- the circumstances they were shot under, sir.
Q: How did he know?
A: Because he had told me to shoot them, sir....
A: I did give ham an estimate figure.
Q: What was that estimated figure you gave him?
A: Between thirty and forty, sir.
Q: Lieutenant Calley, did you just not testify within the last twenty minutes that you did not give any estimated figure?
A: No, I don't believe I did. You asked me if -- what Captain Medina said. I'd say he asked me for a body count. I told him to go on and make whatever he thought sufficient, that he'd been through the village.
Q: You didn't testify that you told Captain Medina that you -- he would have to use whatever he thought was appropriate based on the circumstances and he could come up with a figure he wanted?
A: Yes, sir. he surely could, sir.
Q: Was it your testimony now that you told him thirty to forty?
A: Sometime during the conversation, yes, sir. . .
Q: How did you come up with thirty or forty?
A: Off the top of my head, sir.
Q: Did he press you for a body count?
A: He said, just take something off the top of my head.
Q: So you said thirty or forty?
A: Right, sir.
Q: Did he ask for a weapons count?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you tell him for that?
A: Zero that I had, sir.
Q: How did you know?
A: We didn't have any weapons, sir.
Q: You never questioned any of your men as to how many people they killed?
A: No, sir.
Q: And you didn't pick this thirty or forty based on the people you had scene?
A: No, sir, I didn't. . . That was a relative high body count of what I figured I had seen dead in that village, sir.
Q: And you gave him thirty or forty, and why did he then give you fifty?
A: That is the body count we wanted to submit, sir. I wasn't going to sit there and argue with him about body count. Mine was off the top fo my head. that is what he felt -- he thought.
Q: I want this clear. Is it your testimony that you gave him an estimate of thirty or forty, or is it your testimony that you said, "I don't have an estimate; you pick whatever you want"?
A:: I said both, sir....
Q: Let me ask you this: Did you have any Vietnamese save up for the mine field?
A: No, sir, I did not.
Q: Did you testify that you received any order before you left LZ-Dotti to save some of them for the mine field?
A: Yes, sir, I did.
Q: Why didn't you save some up for the mine field?
A: Captain Medina rescinded that order and told me to waste them, sir.
Q: When did he rescind that order?
A: When he called me on the radio, when he was in the eastern part of the village, sir.
Q: Did he specifically tell you to disregard the previous order?
A: No, sir. He said those people were slowing me down, waste them, sir.
Q: Save none fo the mine field?
A: No, sir.
Q: So you interpreted it to mean save none for the mine field, is that right?
A: The second time he told me, yes, sir.
Q: Were you concerned about utilizing people for the mine field?
A: Yes, sir, I was.
Q: Did you ask him that you thought it might not be advisable to save people for the mine field? A: not after he told me the second time.
Q; How many people would you use to take to the mine field?
A: Never any larger than the front I was covering, sir. If I had five men on the front, I wouldn't use more than five, sir. If I had twenty-man front, I would use no more than twenty, sir.
Q: One per man?
A: yes, sir.
Paul Meadlo, Witness for the Prosecution Direct examination by Aubrey Daniels:
Q: What did you do in the village?
A: We just gathered up the people and led them to a designated area.
Q: How many people did you gather up?
A: Between thirty and fifty. Men, women, and children.
Q: What kind of children?
A: They were just children.
Q: Where did you get these people?
A: Some of the was in hooches and some was in rice paddies when we gathered them up.
Q: Why did you gather them up?
A: We suspected them of being Viet Cong. And as far as I'm concerned, they're still Viet Cong....
Q: What did you do when you got there?
A: Just guarded them.
Q: Did you see Lieutenant Calley?
A: Yes
Q: What did he do?
A: He came up to mean and he said, "You know what to do with them, Meadlo," and I assumed he wanted me to guard them. That's what I did.
Q: What were the people doing?
A: They were just standing there....
A: [Calley] said, "How come they're not dead?" I said, I didn't know we were supposed to kill them." He said, I want them dead." He backed off twenty or thirty feet and started shooting into the people -- the Viet Cong -- shooting automatic. He was beside me. He burned four or five magazines. I burned off a few, about there. I helped shoot ‘em.
Q: What were the people doing after you shot them?
A: They were lying down.
Q: Why were they lying down?
A: They was mortally wounded.
Q: How were you feeling at that time?
A: I was mortally upset, scared, because of the briefing we had the day before.
Q: Were you crying?
A: I imagine I was....
Q: Were there any Vietnamese there?
A: Yes, there was Viet Cong there. About seventy-five to a hundred, standing outside the ravine....
A: Then Lieutenant Calley said to me, "We've got another job to do, Meadlo".
Q: What happened then?
A: He started shoving them off and shooting them in the ravine.
Q: How many times did he shoot?
A: I can't remember.
Q: Did you shoot?
A: Yes. I shot the Viet Cong. he ordered me to help kill people. I started shoving them off and shooting.
Q: How long did you fire?
A: I don't know.
Q: Did you change magazines?
A: Yes. Q: Did Lieutenant Calley change magazines?
A: Yes. <
